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Seeing through the Logical Framework 
 
In this study we examine the key management and scientific traditions that inform the 
logical framework, a project planning and evaluation tool that is central to how many 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) manage their projects and provide accounts 
to funders. Through an analysis of USAID reports from the 1960s and 70s, interviews 
with the logical framework’s developers, and a close reading of seminal texts, we 
identify how systems theory, management by objectives, and scientific theory 
informed how USAID problematized its project planning and evaluation practices and 
how they came to be inscribed into the logical framework as a way to address such 
perceived problems. We argue that these traditions are important for understanding a 
particular strand of managerialization that informs international development NGOs, 














Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are a principal vehicle for global 
development interventions (Barnett 2011; Banks et al. 2015). Often, funding agencies 
have a direct influence on how NGOs do their work (Brown and Gaughlin 2006; 
Banks et al. 2015). One way of doing so is through performance measurement and 
accountability requirements such as logical frameworks, budgets, evaluations, and 
strategic and operational plans, which NGOs often have to implement because of 
pressure from institutional donors (Wallace et al. 1997, p. 31; Martinez and Cooper 
2017; Neesham et al. 2017, p. 199). The logical framework (hence, LF), a project 
planning and evaluation tool, has a long and pervasive impact in international 
development (Hummelbrunner 2010; Hall 2014; Krause 2014; Fernando 2015; 
Martinez and Cooper 2019). It has been used at one time or another by state 
development agencies such as the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) and the German Corporation for International Cooperation 
GmbH (GIZ) and multilateral agencies such as the World Bank and the United 
Nations Development Project (UNDP). Further, international NGOs, such as CARE 
and Oxfam have adopted versions of the LF, alongside countless local NGOs 
implementing projects funded by state agencies and international NGOs (Wallace et 
al. 2006; Ebrahim 2002). 
 
Studying the LF permits us to start addressing the call that “[A]ttention must be paid 
to the theory and paradigms that underpin current aid practices” (Wallace et al. 2006, 
p. 3). This is important because theories and paradigms impact the way we both 
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represent and intervene in the world (Hacking 1983), and as Scott (1998) has so 
dramatically demonstrated, theories of modernization impact how development 
activities and solutions are seen and understood because they inform a way of seeing 
(see also Li 2007; Ferguson 1994). As several commentators have shown, visual 
representations not only frame issues but offer an approach to managing the issues 
(Busco and Quattrone 2015).  
 
The modern state “sees” through information and measurement systems that make 
populations legible according to its model (Scott 1998). State bodies, such as 
international development agencies, intervene around the world in the name of 
“development” through, inter alia, management tools which represent and constitute a 
particular type of beneficiary (Krause 2014) and field of intervention (Martinez and 
Cooper 2017). Through tools such as the LF the state sees NGO projects at a distance, 
as funding agencies require NGOs to use it to plan, monitor, and evaluate their 
development projects (Rottenburg 2009). Through it, users can fit the dynamic world 
of development into “grids,” where “exceptionally complex, illegible, and local social 
practices […] could be centrally recorded and monitored” (Scott 1998, p. 2). Unlike 
Scott and others (Krause 2014; Martinez and Cooper 2017), we don’t study how such 
grids constitute populations, but focus on how the grid itself has been constituted by 
analyzing the scientific and management traditions that are visually inscribed into the 
LF—into the “scripts” that inform its usage (D’Adderio 2008). It is through such a 
visibility tool that the state and aid agencies make the site of intervention, such as the 




Since the 1970s, the LF has become one of the more ubiquitous project management 
tools in international development, and while it has been widely studied and critiqued 
(Wallace et al. 1997; Wallace et al. 2006; Ebrahim 2002; Fernando 2005; Hall 2014; 
Krause 2014; Martinez and Cooper 2019; Fujita 2010; Gasper 2000), little work has 
been done on the dominant paradigm and theories that informed it. Through a review 
of USAID archives, interviews with actors central in the development and 
popularization of the LF, and the analysis of texts that were influential in the 1960s, 
we identify and explore the salient traditions of systems theory, management by 
objectives, and scientific theory. We trace how these management and scientific 
traditions are implicated in problematizing evaluation in USAID in the 1960s and 
how they were, and are, made persistent in international development by being 
inscribed into the LF’s 4 x 4 template. Through this, we contribute to the study of the 
LF and the managerialization of non-profits in two ways.  
 
First, we identify the management and scientific traditions implicated in 
problematizing evaluation in USAID and visually expressed in the LF. This is 
important because we learn how ideas are woven together and are visually 
consolidated in the LF (into the “scripts” that inform its usage). Studies have 
examined how the LF plugs into a suite of project management devices such as 
budgets, operational plans, and strategic plans, facilitated through the devices’ visual 
features, labels, and orders (Martinez and Cooper 2019). Studies have also examined 
the LF in an organizational setting (Ebrahim 2002; Fernando 2005) and in the broader 
field of international development (Krause 2014; Wallace et al. 1997; Wallace et al. 
2006). These studies have shown that the LF depoliticizes and prioritizes 
interventions with measurable objectives, thereby affecting the focus and work of 
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NGOs. Although Krause (2014) and Fernando (2005) shed light on the debates in 
USAID around project evaluation and planning that gave rise to the LF, they do not 
explore the traditions that informed this particular way of viewing the problem and 
how these traditions, these theories, are visually inscribed into the LF.  
 
Second, our device-oriented focus contributes to the study of managerialization in the 
non-profit sector (Roberts et al. 2005; Jones et al. 2011; Hvenmark 2015). We know 
that managerialization has been diffused in nonprofits and that funders, such as the 
state, significantly impact the sector they finance through accountability requirements 
(Martinez and Cooper 2017; Brown and Gaughlin 2009). But studies of the 
managerialization of non-profits often define it as “corporate management” 
(Hvenmark 2013) or “organisational management” (Jones et al. 2011, p. 633), with 
little reference to project management’s close linkages to the foundational traditions 
of the 1960s in the US government. Our study of the LF allows us to trace the 
traditions that inform a particular brand of managerialism in USAID. It is important to 
trace these traditions because, as we have learned from the literature on managerial 
discourses, they give an aura of rationality to decision-making without interrogating 
the type of rationality (Townley et al. 2003) and displace other forms of expression, 
thereby changing how users think about and do their work (Oakes et al. 1998). Part of 
this power materializes these discourses as visual graphs, such as the LF’s matrix or 
the four perspectives of the Balanced Scorecard, to “motivate certain actions” and 
foster a particular “range of interpretations” (Free and Qu 2011, p. 159).  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we position the paper in the NGO 
managerialization and LF literatures. In section 3 we discuss James Scott’s (1998) 
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analysis of how the state “sees” and the study of how dominant traditions are 
inscribed into tools such as the LF. In section 4 we describe our methodology. This is 
followed by section 5, where we describe how the LF is problematized and the 
traditions that inform it. Finally, in section 6, we present our discussion and a 
concluding statement.  
 
2. The LF and the managerialization of development  
While there are studies of the many management and administrative tools (such as 
cost benefit analyses, social return on investment, and program evaluation) that have 
been used in international development and non-profits, studies have identified and 
analyzed the centrality and ubiquity of the LF and its variants over the last few 
decades (Hummelbrunner 2010; Gasper 2000; Martinez and Cooper 2019; Fernando 
2015). The LF has been the subject of numerous critiques based on the examination of 
what the LF does, rather than what it aims to do in international development and in 
specific organizations. Edwards and Hulme (1996, p. 968) write that LF approaches 
have been “overemphasizing short-term quantitative targets and favoring hierarchical 
management structures.” For Ebrahim (2002, p. 98) the LF is a “technocratic tool: It 
organizes and reduces complex social and political realities into simplified and 
discrete components of a ‘project’”. Similarly, Wallace et al. (2006) argues that the 
LF is an inflexible tool that favors managerial-technical expertise and excludes those 
components that don’t comply with its rational framework. For Gasper (2000, p. 17), 
“logframes are inevitably simplifications” that are “prone to rigidification and thus to 
blocking rather than aiding adaptation.”  
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Others have studied the LF’s claim to neutrality by examining how managerialism 
and science inform it. Krause (2010; 2014) positions the LF as part of a wave of 
results-based management reforms that sought to hold development agencies 
accountable and constituted beneficiaries as the object of development intervention. 
Fernando (2015) provides an account of the events around the formation of USAID 
that both “formalised” the delivery of development and gave rise to concerns over 
proper project evaluation. Central is that the LF was proposed in the dawn of the 
1970s as a formal and “neutral instrument” to evaluate USAID projects. Hall (2014, 
p. 321) shows how the LF is informed by the scientific method with its “strong focus 
on systematic observation, gathering of observable and measurable evidence, and a 
concern with objective and robust experimental procedures.”  
 
There are also studies that ground their analysis on the LF’s visual features as a way 
to study its effects. Martinez and Cooper (2019) examine how the LF’s design enables 
users to connect it to a constellation of other management devices that work on, and 
with, other devices, for example budget, operational, and strategic technologies. They 
argue that the LF is not neutral because its visual features enable other functionalities, 
while occluding other possibilities. We draw on their emphasis on the visual and 
connective aspects of the LF in analyzing the traditions that impact its development 
and pervasiveness. 
 
Like Fernando (2015) and Krause (2010; 2014), we consider the debates in USAID to 
develop a better evaluation tool. Yet, while they identify that USAID sought to 
address problems with project planning and evaluation and the LF’s “multi-
disciplinary origins (military, science and management)” (Fernando 2015, p. 25), we 
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don’t really get a sense of how they make their way into the LF. We ask: Where are 
these ideas in the LF? Hall (2014) provides evidence of how science is articulated in 
the LF, but we argue there is more to it than science. Our aim is to precisely describe 
the management and scientific traditions that are (a) implicated in problematizing 
evaluation in USAID and (b) inscribed, that is, visually articulated, in the LF itself. 
This enables us to trace how systems of thought are interwoven in time and place (in 
USAID), and visually, into the LF.  
 
This device-oriented approach to studying the history of foundational traditions 
contributes to our understanding of the “theory and paradigms that underpin current 
aid practices” (Wallace et al. 2006, p. 3). Such theory and paradigms have been 
diffused through new public management reforms since the 1980s (Hood 1991). 
These reforms intensified NGOs’ reliance on state funding (Edwards and Hulme 
1996) and their adoption of “centralized and standardized measurement frameworks 
and practices for reasons of compliance” (Neesham et al. 2017, p. 199) and 
managerial discourses and practices (Jones et al. 2011; Meyer et al. 2012; Hvenmark 
2013). But as Hvenmark’s (2015) review finds, “even if managerialism seems to play 
an important role in studies of how modern organizations both within and outside 
civil society change it is not always clear what it means” (p. 2836). Our purpose is not 
to contribute an all-encompassing definition of managerialism, or to evaluate it, but to 
rather trace how a particular brand of managerialism is inscribed into a device that is 
deployed throughout the development world.  
   
3. Seeing through the LF grid  
Our starting point is that the modern state “sees” by standardizing otherwise complex 
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social interactions into a “convenient, if partly fictional, shorthand” (Scott 1998, p. 
24). To see a population, the state has to be able to identify the things that it deems 
relevant to see. To do so, state officials record complex social phenomena into a 
simplified grid (Scott 1998, p. 2; Jasanoff 2004). For example, censuses and tax forms 
render diverse populations into categories such as man/woman, single/married, 
rural/urban, employed/unemployed, and various income brackets. This is not just 
about a population of people, this can be done also to a population of trees. Scott 
illustrates this through the case of forest management, the constitution of a “forest that 
was easier for state foresters to count, manipulate, measure, and assess” (p. 15). He 
continues: 
 
The tendency was toward regimentation, in the strict sense of the word. The 
forest trees were drawn up into serried, uniform ranks, as it were, to be 
measured, counted off, felled, and replaced by a new rank and file of lookalike 
conscripts. As an army, it was also designed hierarchically from above to 
fulfill a unique purpose and to be at the disposition of a single commander. At 
the limit, the forest itself would not even have to be seen; it could be “read” 
accurately from the tables and maps in the forester’s office. (Scott 1998, p. 15) 
 
The state does not just record the world through its (inevitably) simplified model, but 
imposes its grid-like model onto forests, towns, cities (and development projects). 
Similar schemes to record and manage are deployed by organizations to manage their 
objects of interest. Such organizations are not necessarily a monolith, a unitary brain: 
for example, interventions are by “not only the state apparatus but also an array of 
authorities”—there are scholars and consultants involved in developing state 
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ambitions, interventions, and tools (Li 2008, p. 383). Moreover, Scott mainly 
investigates how the state represents and intervenes to exercise a modernist political 
ambition, our interest is in the production of the tools to govern and “intervene at a 
distance” (Miller and Rose 1990; Latour 1987). Focusing on the tools is important. A 
development agency’s planning and evaluation office is at the center of a network of 
knowledge accumulation and control “through a range of devices, instruments, 
calculations and inscriptions” (Miller and O’Leary 2007, p. 707).  
 
This broad view of the state, including other authorities, and the centrality we give to 
how state tools are developed, sensitizes us to the scientific and management ideas 
and the role of consultants in problematizing state planning and evaluation practices 
and how these are subsequently inscribed into the LF. Recall that the LF is a gridding 
tool; a matrix that represents intentions, populations, and projects and places them 
into a certain order. Our interest, then, is to study how this gridding tool is informed 
by particular forms of thinking, by specific aspirations, by particular modes of 
improvement (Miller and Rose 1990; Li 2007). We trace how specific forms of 
thinking make their way into a project management tool’s visual characteristics 
(Pollock and D’Adderio 2012; Martinez and Cooper 2019; Free and Qu 2011). For 
D’Adderio (2008, p. 11), devices contain a “complex range of rules and assumptions 
[…] embedded within technology both at the design and usage stage.” At the center of 
our study is to investigate the dominant scientific and management “rules and 
assumptions” that are inscribed into the device itself. When these ideas are 
consolidated into 4 x 4 matrix such as the LF they become deployable and gain a 
certain scientific and rational aura that informs the way people think and act (Oakes et 
al. 1998; Free and Qu 2011; Latour 1987). 
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To summarize, Scott (1998) helps us understand how the state represents and imposes 
a simplified grid-like model on a population. We however are sensitive that there are 
more “authorities” implicated in this than “just” the state (in our case scientific and 
management ideas and consultants) and to the importance of studying the tools of 
state intervention—of studying the theories and paradigms that inform the grid. This 
provides some needed insight into the study of managerialism in international 
development because it goes beyond saying that the state has been informed by 
private sector managerial discourses and technologies, to more precisely map out how 
these traditions and related principles1 inform the need for and the design of the LF, as 
well as the actions of those involved in development work. 
 
4. Method 
We consulted USAID archives, conducted interviews with actors central to the 
development and popularization of the LF, and analyzed relevant and important texts 
of the traditions that were influential in the 1960s. Before describing our sources in 
more detail, it is worthwhile to briefly describe the object of our analysis.   
The LF template has horizontal and vertical dimensions (see Figure 1). The vertical 
axis includes the project’s narrative or hierarchy of objectives: An if-then, hypothesis-
based, relationship between program goals, project purpose, output, and 
activities/resources. At the very top of the hierarchy of objectives we find the goal, 
which states the program’s objective to which the project contributes. The project 
 
1 Each tradition (e.g. system analysis) has principles (e.g., a system is part of larger 
systems, and/or a system is defined by its objectives). These principles, as we will 
show, informed the LF. 
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purpose describes the expected effect, and the outputs are the results achieved through 
activities. The activities/resources include the processes carried out and the inputs 
used. The horizontal axis is mainly used to monitor and evaluate the project. That is, 
each project is monitored through the objectively verifiable indicators, means of 
verification, and assumptions columns: what information is to be produced; what 
evidence is available to project designers, executers, and evaluators to measure 
success; and what factors (risks, uncontrollable factors, and assumptions) may affect 
project completion.  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
Learning about the dominant traditions that informed the LF required accessing and 
analyzing the reports that problematized project planning and evaluation in USAID 
and that proposed the LF as a solution. These include reports by Fry Consultants Inc., 
which later became Practical Concepts Inc., the consulting firm responsible for 
submitting reports to USAID from 1970 to about a 1987 on a variety of management 
and training programs. The planning and evaluation problems identified by Fry 
Consultants Inc. and Practical Concepts Inc., though, can be traced back to the 1960s. 
We consulted a handful of late USAID 1960s reports that were referenced by 
subsequent ones, and importantly, by the Fry Consultants Inc. and Practical Concepts 
Inc. reports that followed (see Appendix 1 for list of cited reports). This Appendix 
provides a map of how ideas about project evaluation and their relationship to 
planning were articulated over time in USAID. Importantly, these different 
articulations would make their way into LF-related interventions.   
We also conducted interviews by phone/Skype and in person (in Washington DC) 
with the LF’s developers, Leon Rosenberg and Larry Posner. We interviewed 
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Rosenberg twice in 2011 by Skype and Posner once by phone in 2011 and once in 
person in Washington DC in 2012, where he granted us access to his personal 
archives containing his Fry Consultants Inc. and Practical Concepts Inc. files. There 
were also numerous email exchanges between them and us. We also interviewed two 
former Practical Concepts Inc. trainers, and three project/program evaluation experts 
and trainers (see Appendix 1 for list of interviews).  
In total we interviewed seven people who provided additional perspective into the 
LF’s history. We adopted a snowball sampling approach, where participants were 
asked about others who were involved. These interviewees were selected for their 
involvement with program evaluation and the LF, and their consulting work with 
USAID and other international development agencies in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Interviews lasted between 50 and 120 minutes and were digitally recorded and 
transcribed verbatim. The interviews were semi-structured, covering issues such as: 
the institutional context and modes of project planning and evaluation before and 
during the development of the LF, the challenges of introducing and adapting the LF 
to the organization’s needs, and the intellectual traditions and institutional factors that 
the participants suggested were implicated in how development planning and 
evaluation were problematized in USAID and how the LF was developed as a 
possible solution. Interviews were thus not standardized but tailored to the 
interviewees’ interests, experiences, and expertise. 
 
These interviews and reports were analyzed, generally following an anthropological 
approach (Berg and Lune 2012), to identify and then code the main traditions. Once 
these traditions became more explicit we carefully examined some of these traditions’ 
dominant texts to learn about their assumptions and claims. For instance, once we 
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identified that the LF was influenced by systems theory, we immersed ourselves in 
influential systems theory and cybernetic texts of the time. Management by 
Objectives (MBO) was also identified by our interviewees, and we traced the 
principles of this tradition by carefully studying key MBO texts. These traditions also 
influenced one another, as we will indicate later.   
 
 5. Informing the LF  
In this section we analyze how planning and evaluation was problematized through a 
series of reports published in USAID in the 1960s. It indicates how systems theory 
informed the main critiques of planning and evaluation and how it laid the foundation 
for further interventions through MBO and science. Analyzing how these ideas and 
consultants come together to problematize USAID’s planning and evaluation helps 
identify the different “authorities” implicated in this state project. In a subsequent 
section we will trace how these problematizing traditions are inscribed into the LF 
itself. 
 
5.1. A systems view of planning. 
USAID underwent in the 1960s an important transformation in how it viewed 
international development. Modernization theories of development (notably, Rostow 
1960/1971), which emphasized capital-intensive projects and macro-economic 
planning, gave way to technical assistance projects in response to the former’s 
perceived failure to increase growth and alleviate poverty (Rondinelli 1993, p. 10). 
This transformation implicated a new focus on public administration in the name of 
“institution-building”—an approach to “modernizing governments and of expanding 
their capacities to carry out development activities more effectively” (Rondinelli 
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1993, p. 52). It also implicated a need to “develop and program new doctrines and 
instruments of international cooperation” (Esman and Montgomery 1969, p. 523).  
 
Early in this transformation USAID started to encounter a couple of problems in 
technical assistance project planning and evaluation. One, that project lessons were 
not feeding into USAID “memory” and into future planning, and vice-versa. Two, 
that projects were not feeding into larger programs, and vice-versa. That is, the 
project, as a system, was not providing feedback, and was not feeding into the larger 
systems that it was a part of. 
 
Systems theory considers systems as a whole rather than as self-contained parts. The 
approach is not just a theory for management, but a theory of theories that resonates 
with systems found in the social and biological worlds (Kast and Rosenzweig 1972, p. 
447). All phenomena are systems within larger systems: a hierarchical relationship 
whereby one system feeds outputs into another larger system, which includes them as 
inputs. These inter-related systems are goal oriented. For example, “the business 
organization is a system of interrelated parts working in conjunction with each other 
in order to accomplish a number of goals” (Johnson et al. 1964, p. 383). 
Organizational and management scholars, Stafford Beer and Robert Anthony 2 
emphasized feedback loops for the proper functioning of systems. This principle is at 
the center cybernetics, “the science of control” (Beer 1959, p. xv), which views the 
“operational control system as analogous to a thermostat that turns the furnace on and 
off according to perception of changes in temperature” (Anthony 1965, p. 82). A 
 
2 Antony worked under Robert McNamara in the Department of Defense, where 
system thinking was influential. 
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system provides feedback: it enables managers to intervene to restore order to a 
system. 
 
Systems analysis and cybernetics were central to the problematization of planning and 
evaluation in USAID. An important starting point is the 1965 Booz Allen Hamilton 
report commissioned by USAID to conduct a “broad reconnaissance study” (Booz 
Allen Hamilton 1965, n.p.) of the agency’s planning and evaluation. The report states 
that evaluations for both capital and technical assistance projects were “sporadic” and 
provided “little feedback” (p. 38). The concern with the lack of evaluation and 
learning was seen as a problem of memory: “It has often been said that AID has an 
inadequate memory” (ibid, p. 38)—there was no “evaluative memory” (ibid, p. 88). 
They essentially identify a cybernetic problem: that there is “little joint planning or 
feedback of earlier successes and failures into the current review processes” (ibid, p. 
39). In the name of feedback, Booz Allen Hamilton suggest, that USAID needs to 
improve evaluation, the output of which, should feed, as input, into USAID memory. 
 
Soon after, in October 1965, Special Advisor to the Administrator Agency for 
International Development, Colonel George Lincoln, a West Point faculty member, 
released a report also stressing the need for internal evaluation in the agency. The 
report proposes an “emphasis on program evaluation as a basis for bringing further 
improvements in programming [i.e., planning] and implementation” (Lincoln 1965, p. 
151). In contrast to the previous report, though, this one stresses that evaluation, 
should feed, as input, into “improved program execution as much as to improved 
planning” (ibid. p. 12), and not just memory. 
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The Agency worked on the Booz Allen Hamilton and Lincoln suggestions for a 
couple of years, including the introduction of a task force and the adoption of “work 
plan and progress evaluation efforts” at several of its missions (USAID 1966, p. 52). 
In 1967 Joel Bernstein, then Special Assistant to the Administrator, was asked to 
supervise the “design of an evaluation system” (Bernstein 1968, p. 5). His 1968 report 
links programming (“planning”), implementation (“doing it”), and evaluation 
(“examining what actually happened”). Whereas Lincoln notes that evaluation should 
feed into planning future projects, Bernstein notes that “evaluation planning should be 
linked to activity planning (or programming) from the start” (ibid. 1968, Tab B, p. 
57). This meant that planning should feed into evaluation, rather than Lincoln’s focus 
on evaluation feeding into planning. Their relationship is problematized differently, 
yet both are concerned with the feedback principle of connecting planning to 
evaluation and future projects. One outcome of Bernstein’s report is the Project 
Appraisal Report (PAR) form, “which provides a check list on progress and an 
analytical narrative” for non-capital projects (Bernstein 1968, p. 668 [p. 7]).  
Bernstein’s report was followed by another wave of interventions in USAID’s 
evaluation system by Fry Consultants Inc., who were contracted to review Bernstein’s 
suggestions. One of their initial contributions to the problematizations of project 
planning and evaluation was to more explicitly integrate MBO principles into the 
system and cybernetic views that had so far informed the analysis. 
MBO is often associated with Peter Drucker (1954). The central idea is that each 
manager at whatever level of the organization requires clear objectives that should be 
derived from the organization’s strategic goals (p. 126). He writes: “the objectives of 
every manager should spell out his contributions to the attainment of company goals 
in all areas of the business (Drucker 1954, p. 127, emphasis in original). A manager’s 
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performance aims “upward rather than downward” (ibid., p. 128). This link between 
one unit’s objectives and a higher level unit links management by objectives to 
systems theory’s hierarchy of systems. Hofstede (1978) notes that with MBO, 
hierarchically arranged managers can set objectives, conduct performance reviews, 
and take corrective action (i.e., feedback).  
 
This mode of thinking informed the methodology Fry Consultants used for their 
“year-long study of the evaluation of non-capital projects” at USAID’s offices 
worldwide (Fry Consultants Inc. 1970b, p. ii). They developed on Bernstein’s view 
that proper planning was necessary for evaluation by suggesting that projects be 
evaluated in relation to the project’s expected objectives, its plan. While Bernstein’s 
PAR and related tools improved the “quality of design and planning” (ibid. 1970a, p. 
6), the consultants objected that it was “annoying to fill out” (ibid. 1970a, p. 16), 
showed “confusion about project purposes and superior objectives” (p. 10), and had a 
“lack of clear targets” (p. 12). This confusion is elaborated:  
 
USAID project personnel are in the position of platoon commanders who don't 
know what the company objectives are. They have been told to fight well and 
bravely, and on occasion they have been told to ‘take Hill 414.’ But they have 
not been told that the company objectives are to create a salient comprising 
Hills 413, 414 and 415. Lacking such insight into the broader objectives, 
USAID personnel find it difficult to intelligently replan their projects and their 




This is a restatement of the cybernetic focus on feedback, but with the introduction of 
objectives as central for re-planning. The system analysis and MBO intersection, 
though, is at its most explicit when Fry Consultants Inc. write that PAR’s “logic of 
evaluation” is not “clear,” “the higher goals, for which a tabulation is provided, are 
rarely defined to show or imply a logical connection between project outputs and 
higher goals” (ibid. 1970b, p. II-4-5). While PAR was designed to feed planning into 
the evaluation process and vice versa (cybernetic control through feedback), it did not 
help planners and evaluators link projects and activities to the broader system of 
objectives they are a part of (linked hierarchy of systems). Fry Consultants Inc., as 
such, found that projects were sometimes designed without clear objectives in mind. 
As we will see in the subsequent section, a hierarchy of systems, each with its own 
objectives, was designed into the LF to address this concern. 
 
Fry Consultants Inc. reports also helped introduce a notion of science into project 
management at USAID. Science for Fry Consultants Inc. was a way to model (and 
test) the link between project objectives and program objectives. They argue (see 
figure 2): “AID programs and projects can be viewed as a series of linked 
developmental hypotheses. These hypotheses are conveniently stated as linked ‘if-
then’ statements, with the ‘then’ of a subordinate hypotheses (e.g., ‘if outputs, then 
purpose’) being the ‘if’ of a superior statement (e.g., ‘if purpose, then goal’)” (Fry 
Consultants Inc. 1970c, p. II-20). This served as a way to critique projects as not 
rigorously designed—that is not only did PAR not have clear objectives, it was not 
good science. As we will show in the next section, this modelling approach provided 
an important conceptual foundation for the LF.  
[Insert figure 2 here] 
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In this section we show how elements of systems analysis and cybernetics can be 
found in the reports published by Booz Allen Hamilton, Lincoln, Bernstein, and Fry 
Consultants in the late 1960s. There were initially two concerns around project 
evaluation. One, the cybernetic principle of feedback: the concern was about how can 
USAID learn from its projects and feed these lessons into its “memory” and future 
projects. Second, the system analysis principle that systems feed into other systems, 
which Fry Consultants Inc. identified as a significant problem in USAID—projects 
were not feeding into larger programs. Later, Fry Consultants Inc., identified another 
problem: that project planning and evaluation was not just a systems and cybernetic 
problem, but also a problem of how objectives ought to be managed and how the 
scientific notion of hypothesis can serve as a way to connect systems and their 
objectives.  
 
These concerns are at the center of the LF. As we will show in the next section, by 
studying how these traditions informed the problematization of project planning and 
evaluation practices in USAID in the 1960s, we set the stage for learning how their 
principles informed the LF itself as a solution and how the state is at the center of 
these reforms, while also acknowledging the diverse “authorities” (notably 
consultants) who are not formally part of the state. 
 
5.2. Inscribing the LF  
The LF was not the main proposition of the Fry Consultants Inc. 1970 report, but was, 
“an important part of the recommended systems improvements” (Fry Consultants Inc. 
1970b, p. IV-4). According to Rosenberg and Posner, their recommendations received 
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significant support from within the agency.3 Riding this wave of support they formed 
their own consulting firm, Practical Concepts Inc., which was awarded a contract by 
USAID to revise the evaluation system critiqued in the Fry Consultants Inc. report 
using the same principles: System theory, MBO, and science.  
 
The LF swiftly becomes a central element of the 1970 USAID Evaluation Handbook. 
We see the LF’s visualization as a 4 x 4 matrix and its associated philosophies (as we 
will develop below) having an impact on the agency’s evaluation and planning tools. 
For example, earlier planning tools such as the Non-capital Project Paper (PROP) 
from 1967 look quite different from a PROP from 1976, which include the LF grid in 
its project summary section. Funding proposals were required to frame projects using 
the LF, which, as a subsequent Evaluation Handbook noted, “sets the stage for the 
evaluation” of projects (USAID 1976, p. 14). Further, the LF became the language of 
AID through a training campaign in every mission of AID which highlighted its grid 
to conceptualize and visualize projects (Solem 1987; Practical Concepts Inc. 1981).  
 
The LF thus became a central part in USAID’s project planning and evaluation 
system. For Rosenberg, the LF added “rationality to bureaucracy” and “shows the 
bright light of reason” (Rosenberg, interview, 2011). In other words the way USAID 
would see how it is intervening at a distance is rationalized through systems theory, 
management by objectives, and scientific theory. In what follows we show how the 
ideas used to problematize USAID project management were weaved into the LF. 
These, ideas are not independent of one another, they influence one another, and one 
 
3 In an interview, Rosenberg referred to Herb D. Tuner and Robert L. Hubbell, of the 
agency’s Program Evaluation Committee, as the LF’s “midwifery team.” 
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finds their intersection in the LF. They are “different points of view [which] can be 
brought to bear simultaneously, completing rather than opposing each other” 
(Practical Concepts Inc. 1979, p. II-1).  
 
5.2.1 Systems theory 
“the development of a logical framework for the design of large and complex 
systems has become of ever more pressing urgency.” (Hrones 1964, p. ix) 
 
One of the most explicit traditions that influenced the LF is Systems Theory. For 
Schmidt (2009, p. 42), a former Practical Concepts Inc. trainer, systems thinking is 
the “conceptual foundation of the LF.” When Fry Consultants Inc. critiqued PAR’s 
“confusion about project purposes and superior objectives” (1970a, p. 10), their 
concern was that the project system was not clearly connected to higher level systems. 
The LF is based on the principle that “every project include as part of its definition, 
the largest system of which it is part” (Rosenberg 1983, p. 7-8).4 The project, like the 
program it is a part of, are systems connected to one another, and the LF makes this 
visually explicit by feeding “project purpose” into “program goal.” Rosenberg was 
well familiar with systems as we learned from interviews and from the 1983 
document. Part of it may be traced to his experience working as a contractor for the 
Pentagon, where, at the time, system analysis was in fashion (Chwastiak 1999, p. 
761).  
 
As we learned in the previous section, systems theory informed the problematization 
 
4 Rosenberg (1983) is a 74-page transcript of Rosenberg talking about the LF, in 
particular its intellectual antecedents for a Practical Concepts Inc. video workshop. 
The date is not clear but we believe it is from 1983. 
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of USAID’s evaluation systems through the hierarchy of systems and the principle of 
feedback. These also informed the LF. To start, the LF was designed to represent 
projects as components of a larger system. This is captured by one of the most well-
known features of the LF: its “narrative summary” column. This column structures 
the systems and their relationships: the project’s inputs should feed into its purpose, 
which should feed into the agency’s programmatic goals. This view requires the 
project designer to think about the systems’ inputs and outputs and their relation to 
broader systems; the visualization offers a mode of managing the relation between 
projects and programs.  
 
The LF also inscribes the principles of feedback for evaluation and monitoring. The 
LF assess what happens in a project (whether the outputs have been achieved as 
planned), enabling revision and taking corrective action and/or re-planning. For 
Practical Concepts Inc. (1979, p. II-24) the LF is a tool for project managers to 
“monitor the progress of the project in relation to the achievement of that purpose.” It 
enables the funding agency and project managers to monitor and, if necessary, to 
intervene in the project. The cybernetic principle sensitized Practical Concepts Inc. to 
the problem that there were no feedback loops, no memories created that could feed 
into and improve future projects and revise ongoing ones. There are however two 
types of feedback inscribed in the LF. One is “[f]eedback from the real environment 
that people are trying to influence” (Rosenberg 1983, p. 39). The environment in this 
case is the project, and through the LF’s “objectively verifiable indicators” column, 
project managers can monitor the extent to which the project activities and results 
have been advancing or not according to a set benchmark—enabling managers to 
respond and intervene to restore order to a system. There is another type of feedback 
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that the objectively verifiable indicators column also enables: “the feedback about 
how each member deploys himself relative to the other; how well or poorly he is 
doing vis-a-vis his assigned task” (Rosenberg 1983, p. 46). In this sense, the LF is 
used to hold project managers accountable for achieving the plan outlined in the LF 
(we develop on this in section 5.2.3). 
 
The LF is part of the aspiration to create a “culture of program management and not 
just project management” (Rosenberg, interview, 2011), to place the project in a 
broader systems-informed grid. The LF’s narrative summary column visually 
articulated the agency’s program-project administrative structure as two systems that 
feed into one another. The LF matrix also makes explicit the cybernetic principle of 
feedback, using project measures such as those in the objectively verifiable indicators 
column to visually represent the project and the manager responsible for the project. 
This feedback loop responsibilizes the agency and project managers for planning, 
monitoring, and evaluating inputs, outputs, projects and programs, and their 
relations—it exerts a type of control that is intended to be total, rational, and 
technocratic.  
  
5.2.2 Management by objectives 
The LF’s “narrative summary,” also called the “hierarchy of objectives,” is informed 
by both systems theory and MBO. Through it, the LF visually articulates that each 
system has its own objectives to be managed. The notion of a hierarchy of objectives 
precedes the LF. One finds earlier uses of the terms in a Harvard Business Review 
article by Granger (1964, p. 6) who notes, “there is a ranking or hierarchy of 
objectives, proceeding in concept from the very broad to the specific. Logically, the 
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specific or more limited objectives should not be in conflict with the broad 
objectives.”  
 
Each system has its own objective, connected through a means-end logic. A former 
Practical Concepts Inc. trainer, Larry Cooley, suggested that the LF includes a 
“means-end” thinking and a process of working backwards from broader objective to 
more specific objectives and inputs. For Herbert Simon, who promoted means-end 
thinking:  
 
In the process of decision those alternatives are chosen which are considered 
to be appropriate means for reaching desired ends. Ends themselves, however, 
are often merely instrumental to more final objectives. We are thus led to the 
conception of a series, or hierarchy, of ends. Rationality has to do with the 
construction of means-ends chains of this kind. (1997/1945, p. 73)  
 
This means-end thinking connects the various systems that compose the LF, 
providing a “hierarchy of goals or a means-end structure” (Wallroth 1968, p. 110). 
For example, the LF grid shows that the project’s “output” is a means to achieve the 
objectives articulated in the “project purpose,” which in turn feeds into the program 
level goal.  
 
For Practical Concepts Inc., the LF was a way to introduce MBO into the planning 
and evaluation of projects:  
 
Planning was too vague: Objectives were multiple and not clearly related to 
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project activities. There was no clear picture of what the project would look 
like if it were successful. Thus, evaluators could not compare—in an objective 
manner—what was planned with what actually happened. (Practical Concepts 
Inc. 1979, p. I-1 emphasis original) 
 
The hierarchy of objectives is the clearest way in which MBO is articulated into the 
LF’s matrix. This provides an important visual feature: The objectives provide a 
“clear picture” of the connections between the LF’s different hierarchical systems and 
objectives, and, importantly, of project success. 
 
5.2.3 Scientific approach 
The scientific approach to management is often equated with scientific management 
and a quest for efficiency and control of the labor process (Taylor 1903; Braverman 
1974). In the LF, however, we find science invoked around the principle of 
hypothesis testing, an approach that we find in contemporary management devices 
such as strategy maps: “The cause-and-effect logic of this design constitutes the 
hypotheses of the strategy” (Kaplan and Norton 2001, p. 69; emphasis original). This 
sensitivity to science aimed to turn “management art into a management science” 
(Rosenberg 1983, p. 11).  
 
The scientific method’s influence on the LF is made explicit in early Fry Consultants 
Inc. and Practical Concepts Inc. reports. For example: 
 
The concepts [in the manual] draw heavily from science, and experience 
gained from the management of complex space age programs, such as the 
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early satellite launchings and the development of the Polaris submarine. Most 
importantly, the concepts help one apply basic scientific methods (including 
hypothesis formulation and testing) to program/project management and are 
complementary with other management tools. (Practical Concepts Inc. 1979, 
p. I-2)  
 
The LF reframed management by objectives’ means-end approach into a set of 
“developmental hypotheses,” a way to specify: If the project intervenes and 
assumptions are correct, then the outcome should be delivered. For example, if 
activities (build water pump and conduct an awareness campaign), then output 
(pumps are built and functional, and people are aware of hygiene and sanitation). This 
hypothesis-based thinking is explicit in the LF grid: if activity, then output; if output, 
then purpose; if purpose, then goal. 
 
The purpose of linking these hypotheses together in the LF is to test projects5; for 
Rosenberg projects are “social experiments”—a series of causal relations (between 
inputs and outputs), the causality of which could be scientifically tested (Cooley, 
interview, 2011; see also Practical Concepts Inc. 1979). The LF matrix acts as “a 
laboratory bench, a mechanism for taking a squirming, live, living thing, such as a 
project” (Rosenberg 1983, p. 5). 
 
Not only do we find science in the LF’s focus on hypotheses and experimentation, but 
we also find a focus on numbers and quantification as part of an appeal to objectivity 
 
5 The LF was proposed for both designing and “for the re-examination of the original 
design of ongoing projects as a necessary prelude to evaluation” (Tuner 1976, p. 10). 
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(Porter 1996). This is most noticeable in the LF’s “means of verification” and 
“objectively verifiable indicators” columns, which provides evidence about results. 
The source of data and numerical indicators are made explicit as a means to monitor 
the project by comparing hypotheses with numerical representations of what actually 
happened.  
 
An experimental view is also sensitive to uncertainty as an intrinsic part of reality—a 
concern also shared in system theory over the uncertainty caused by the interaction 
between system elements. This is most notable in the LF’s “assumptions” column: 
that the hypothesis is true under certain condition. The assumptions column was 
designed for project designers and managers to account for uncertainty. To make 
visible factors that are represented as uncontrollable. The classic managerial 
implication is that project managers should not be held accountable for that which 
they have no control over. For Rosenberg, “if we are formulating this hypothesis and 
we, and superior managers, agree that this hypothesis is possible, where, if I properly 
manage my inputs to produce outputs, and the purpose is not achieved, I am not a bad 
manager, necessarily” (Rosenberg, interview, 2011). The assumption column offers a 
visualization of the limits of management; it sets the “limits of responsibility” 6 of the 




6  Rosenberg acknowledges the influence of contract writing. In particular the 
principle of letting stakeholders know what the contract is about so that it could be 
enforced (Rosenberg 1983, p 12). This requires stakeholders to agree on the LF 
matrix while freeing both parties from responsibility for things beyond their control. 
The grid identifies what is manageable. 
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This above view of the project as linked hypothesis, as experiment, and as uncertain 
became central to USAID’s evaluation approach. Thus:  
 
The underlying assumption on which the entire concept of evaluation rests is 
the recognition that much of what AID is doing is experimental in nature and 
as such cannot be expected to be both relevant and successful in all cases. In 
fact, the development assistance process, like a scientific experiment, may be 
described as a series of hypotheses. We plan that if the donor and the recipient 
countries each provide certain inputs, then a predicted output will occur. This 
is the ‘manageable’ interest. We then hypothesize that if this output does 
occur, then certain economic or social changes will follow. We go on to 
hypothesize further that if these changes take place, then higher living 
standards or national income or political stability or other broad goals will be 
achieved. The evaluator first confirms that the management responsibility was 
met and, if not, analyzes what changes are needed to produce outputs. He then 
becomes the scientist who tests these hypotheses. Were they valid? If not, 
what explicit or implicit assumptions proved incorrect? It is in this 
examination of the development assumptions of significance that evaluation 
goes beyond monitoring and auditing. (USAID 1970, p. 7) 
 
This notion of science informed how the LF’s developers built on MBO’s means-end 
chain; it articulated the relation between the systems’ objectives as if-then hypothesis 
(in the narrative summary column). It also sensitized users to the project as an 
experiment and to uncertainty in project design and accountability (in the assumptions 
column). As the quote above shows, the notions of hypothesis, experimentation, and 
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uncertainty informed USAID’s understanding of project evaluation. 
 
6. Discussion and conclusion 
Systems theory, MBO, and science informed the problematization of planning and 
evaluation in USAID in the 1960s and the subsequent development of the LF. These 
traditions were layered and built on one another; they were “logically interrelated” 
(Rosenberg 1983, p. 16) in their visual integration into LF. For instance, systems 
theory and the cybernetic principle of control informed how one report after another 
problematized project evaluation in AID: as not feeding into memory and future 
plans. Fry Consultants Inc.’s reports were amongst the first to problematize evaluation 
as a problem of planning: better planning was needed for better evaluation. Structured 
planning would generate structured evaluation outcomes that could be feed into future 
plans. To do this USAID’s planning had to consider a few key principles: that a 
project is a system that is part of a larger program-system; that clear objectives be 
articulated for each one of these systems; and that these objectives feed into one 
another through a scientific, if-then, logic. Soon after, Practical Concepts Inc. 
inscribed these managerial and scientific principles into a 4 x 4, as a seemingly simple 
and concise visualization, an “elegant summary” (Posner, interview, 2011) that “could 
be passed around” (Daly, interview, 2011) and deployed throughout the field.  
 
What has been “passed around” from funding agencies to NGOs is not a neutral tool 
(Ebrahim 2002; Fernando 2005; Wallace et al. 1997). These principles are informed 
by paradigms and theories that were prominent in the 1960s and these principles are 
inscribed into the LF; they persist. System analysis, MBO, and science are at the 
center of the hierarchy of objective in the LF’s “narrative summary” column. Projects 
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and programs are seen as systems, each with their respective objectives that are 
hierarchically connected to one another. Science provides a hypothesis-based 
approach that connects these system objectives into one another. We also find these 
principles weaved into other parts of the LF. The “objectively verifiable indicators” 
and “means of verification” columns were designed along (a) the cybernetic principle 
of feedback for project managers to monitor the project’s activities and results; and 
(b) the principle of scientific objectivity through observation and quantification. 
Through these principles, managers can quantitatively monitor and restore order to a 
system. Science is also implicated in how managers are held accountable through the 
“assumptions” column. It holds that the hypothesis (the project experiment) is true 
under certain condition: Funders can’t hold project managers and designers 
accountable for development experiments that don’t go as expected for reasons 
outside their control. This is the managerial principle of controllability.  
 
The importance of discussing these traditions is to point out that project and program 
management could be different. These traditions inform the design of the LF, which 
in turn, provides a standardized way of seeing, representing, and intervening in 
international development (Scott 1998). Traditions both enable particular ways of 
seeing the world, but also occlude alternative visions and approaches to management 
(Oakes et al. 1998). So what might be occluded? Consider if international 
development were seen as a political rather than a rational, managerial, or scientific 
process. A visualization might then focus on political groupings, power dynamics, 
and socio-political effects. Under such a vision, political and social maps might be 
more relevant than technical and causal logics. Such a change in the mode of 
visualization shifts thinking about development choices (March 1978; Flyvbjerg 
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1998; Scott 1998). How management tools visualize matters (Busco and Quattrone 
2015). Similarly what is occluded if management were not so focused on uncertainty 
and controllability? Uncertainty may be understood then not as limiting responsibility 
but as opportunities for imaginative or entrepreneurial activity, for adopting 
technologies of foolishness (March and Olsen 1976), where experimentation and 
playfulness would contrast with the approaches to management that are inscribed into 
the LF grid. 
 
These management and scientific ideas not only informed the LF, though. As 
Martinez and Cooper (2019) show, the LF is connected to other devices that form part 
of its ecosystem: components of the LF, such as the hierarchy of objectives and its 
indicators, make their way into budgets, strategic plans, and operational plans. We 
can thus trace how the paradigms and traditions that informed the LF informed other 
project management and accountability tools in international development. The scope 
of these traditions also extend beyond international development, as they also find 
their articulation in other US Government tools and activities. For instance, in the mid 
1960s McNamara and his team introduced into the Department of Defense a system 
of objectives and cost control formalized as Planning, programming and budgeting 
system (PPBS) that connected the broader objective of national security to the 
subsystems (missions) and programs (Chwastiak 2001; 2006). These traditions have 
also found their way into results-based management initiatives in the 1990s, such as 
the 1993 Government Performance Results Act (Gore 1993). The LF is arguably a 
precursor to the “logic models” (Corbeil 1986; McLaughlin and Jordan 1998) that are 
at the center of public management reforms in many governments (Hood 1991; Olson, 
Guthrie and Humphrey 1988; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004; Krause 2010). For 
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Knowlton and Phillips (2012, p. 6): 
 
U.S. Agency for International Development’s logical framework approach 
(Practical Concepts, Inc. 1971) and Claude Bennett’s (1976) hierarchy of 
program effectiveness were among the earliest uses of the types of visual 
displays that have evolved into the program logic models we know today. 
 
PPBS and results-based management tools such as logic models indicate the extent to 
which the traditions that we discussed in this study inform contemporary government 
administration. These traditions also inform some of the assumptions of cost benefit 
analysis (Clements 1995) and its more modern representation in social return on 
investment approaches (Hall et al. 2015; Arvidson, Lyon, McKay & Moro 2013). For 
a former Practical Concepts Inc. employee, “lessons from international development 
came back to influence public management” (Cooley, interview, 2011) through the 
LF.  
 
Through the case study of the LF we learn about the management and scientific 
traditions that inform how state officials record complex social phenomena into a 
simplified grid-like vision (Scott 1998, p. 2; Jasanoff 2004). In this ambition to see, 
the state fits populations into its grid, enabling projects (such as the forests discussed 
in section 3) to be “‘read’ accurately from the tables and maps in the forester’s office” 
(Scott 1998, p. 15). Scott’s work on the state provides us with a starting point to study 
a state agency as it wrestled with how to “see” its development projects. We however 
focus less on how such state ambitions affect the field of development (see Martinez 
and Cooper [2017] for an example), and more on the dominant forms of thinking that 
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problematized and are inscribed into the state tool of visibility. This focus forces us to 
take seriously the complex of system analysis, objectives management, and 
experimental science inscribed into the LF—how “dominant interests are reflected in 
the form and functioning of a technology” (D’Adderio 2008, p. 773). Management 
and scientific traditions inform the “scripts,” the principles that users engage with 
when performing the LF (D’Adderio 2008; Martinez and Cooper 2019).  
 
Simplifying the world to fit into the state grid is also dangerous. A threat to the LF is 
its connection to bureaucracy—its commitment to the state-grid. For Rosenberg, the 
LF was designed as a tool that adds “rationality to bureaucracy,” “shows the bright 
light of reason,” and enables project teams to self-organize and manage (Rosenberg, 
interview, 2011; Rosenberg 1983). And yet, it can become its own iron cage, a 
procedure. This is significant, because “‘proceduralized’ [is the] most horrible word 
in the bureaucrat’s jargon” (Drucker 1954, p. 133). Such procedural thinking is often 
a “substitute for judgement,” in part because there is a “superstitious belief in the 
magical effect of printed forms that tries to fit things into ‘patterns’” (ibid. p. 133). 
This procedural adherence to the LF grid can lead to “enforcement of a fixed format 
[which] tends to produce illogic… and is prone to rigidification and thus to blocking 
rather than aiding adaptation” (Gasper 2000, p. 17). This focus on procedure and 
rigidification is arguably at odds with the tradition of scientific experimentation7 and 
the view of projects as a “squirming, live, living thing” (Rosenberg 1983, p. 5). This 
 
7  We would like to thank one of the reviewers for this observation. However, 
historical and sociological studies of science show that science itself can be quite 
conservative and unresponsive to innovation and novelty (Kuhn, 1962). Further, 
complaints that the LF stifles innovation may reflect the formalization of aid 
accountability and the power imbalances that are associated with increased scrutiny 
of, and accountability to, funders (Martinez and Cooper, 2017). 
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bureaucratic process-oriented approach found in the 1960s management traditions 
discussed above emphasizes means more than ends and undermines other ways of 
thinking—the project as alive and as experimentation. While the LF was designed 
with experimental science in mind, one often finds the “squirming, live, living” 
project “prone to rigidification” and ossified within the matrix—the living projects 
and scientific experimentation are subsumed into the LF-matrix-state-grid. 
Rosenberg’s ambition to add “rationality to bureaucracy” is exactly what happened: 
this scientifically-informed tool became a component part of a state bureaucratic 
ambition to “see” and in so doing making the world in its image. Science, like 
rationality for Webber, becomes an “iron cage.” For instance, one can experiment 
once the project is framed along the hierarchy of objectives and measured along the 
objectively verifiable indicators found in the LF. This framing, as the accounting 
literature has shown, is constitutive, it enables a certain way of performing it, and not 
other, as a procedure and not an experiment.  
 
This study contributes to the study of the LF and the study of managerialism in 
NGOs. Studies have examined the LF in an organizational setting (Ebrahim 2002; 
Fernando 2005) and in the broader field of international development (Wallace et al. 
1997; Wallace et al. 2006). Others have studied the LF’s historical linkages to 
management thought (Fernando 2005; Krause 2014), to a scientific logic focused on 
“objective and robust experimental procedures” (Hall 2014, p. 322), and how its 
visual features and linguistic tags connect to other project management devices 
(Martinez and Cooper 2019). These studies have shown that the LF depoliticizes 
development interventions and prioritizes interventions with deliverable and 
measurable objectives. It assumes that everything that is important can be adequately 
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measured. The LF “has profoundly influenced the assumptions and management 
practices that shape the way humanitarian NGOs do their work” (Krause 2014, p. 91). 
That is, the LF alters NGO’s work, the field of international development, and the 
other devices that are part of the project management ecosystem. 
 
Krause and Fernando have previously examined some of the management concerns 
that informed USAID’s approach to the LF. Like us they identify the agency’s 
debates about evaluation, planning, and results management. Unlike them, however, 
we describe the management and scientific ideas that informed how USAID 
problematized evaluation and planning and how these ideas were later inscribed into 
the LF itself. We learn how these traditions are woven in during the problematization 
phase and how these are consolidated (and materialized) as a 4 x 4 matrix in the LF. 
Though this matrix, different scientific and management traditions are held together, 
informing how users engage with it (D’Adderio 2008; Martinez and Cooper 2019), 
and perform the way the state sees and intervenes at a distance.   
 
We take a device-centered approach to study how systems theory, MBO, and science 
as experimentation are implicated in the “theory and paradigms that underpin current 
aid practices” (Wallace et al. 2006, p. 3). Such theory and paradigms can be traced to 
specific concerns and ideas about management in the mid 1960s. Tracing this is 
important because managerial discourses introduce a form of rationality, make some 
forms of expression possible and not others, and change how users think when 
visually articulated as a seemingly rational and scientific tool (Townley et al. 2003; 
Free and Qu 2011; Oakes et al. 1998). This is central to our understanding of the 
power of managerialism in NGOs (Roberts et al. 2006; Jones et al. 2011; Meyer et al. 
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2012; Hvenmark 2015) and in government more generally (Hood 1991; Olson, 
Guthrie and Humphrey 1988; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). These constitutive ideas 
and their related form of visualization persist, not only in how the LF informs NGOs 
work (Ebrahim 2002; Fernando 2015) and international development (Krause 2014; 
Wallace et al. 1997; Wallace et al. 2006), and how it plugs into other project 
management devices (Martinez and Cooper 2019), but also in the wave of reforms 
since then, from results based management in the 1990s to the current use of logic 
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Figure 2: Project design as linked hypothesis  
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John Daly USAID Project evaluator 1970s- 90s 
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Fry Consultants Inc. / 
Practical Concepts Inc. 
LF developer and trainer 1960s-70s 
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Fry Consultants Inc. /  
Practical Concepts Inc. 
LF developer and trainer 1960s-70s 
Gerald Schwab USAID Program evaluation officer 1970s 
Terry Schmidt Practical Concepts Inc. Trainer 1970s 
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